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RECENT CASE NOTES

the state may impose upon individuals in order to establish decent social
control. 17 It follows that the purpose of the amendment was not to destroy
the state by depriving it of essential powers.' s The requirement in the statute
is an important police regulation and the courts have not hesitated to recognize it as such. The magnitude of the social interest on one side so completely outweighs the private rights involved, that the courts find no difficulty
whatever in overruling such a contention. And, as already pointed out, one
has only a privilege granted by the state to use the highway, and if he is to
exercise this privilege, he must acquiesce in the conditions attached thereto.
Article 1, Paragraph 21, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides
that "No man's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation," is not a restraint upon the state's police power. In pointing this out,
the principal case cites the case of State v. Richcreek. 19 It is true that the
taking of private property or of personal service for a public use is an exercise of eminent domain for which the state must pay compensation. But the
requirement at hand is not the exercise of the right of eminent domain; it is
the exercise of the state's police power. As such, no compensation is called
for, although the exercise of the latter power may injure or destroy a business, decrease the value of property, impose inconvenience 20or loss upon
individuals, or subject them to economic restraint or burdens.
Regardless of the fact that the case at bar is the initial one in Indiana
on the points involved, it would have indeed been a rare phenomenon if the
court had reached a contrary result. In light of the many decisions on similar
cases which have been handed down by other courts, the issues in the present
L. E. B.
case were perhaps dead before they were tried.

ConstitutionalLaw--Due Process-The Known Use of Perjured Testiinony by the Prosecution Not an Orderly Course of Procedure. Petitioner
seeks an original writ of habeas corpus. He states that he is unlawfully
restrained of his liberty under a commitment pursuant to a conviction, in
February, 1917, of murder in the first degree and sentence of death, later
commuted to life imprisonment. Petitioner charges that the state holds him
in confinement without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The grounds of his
charge are that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony which
was knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities in order to obtain that
conviction, and also that these authorities deliberately suppressed evidencewhich would have impeached and refuted the testimony thus given against
him. He alleges that he could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence
have discovered, prior to the denial of his motion for a new trial and his
appeal to the state 'Supreme Court, the evidence which was subsequently
developed and which proved the testimony against him to have been perjured. Held, the known use of perjured testimony and suppression of testkmony which would refute the perjured testimony, by the prosecuting authorities of a state in a criminal trial, violates the constitutional guaranty that no
person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process
'7 Butler v. Perry (1916), 240 U. S. 328, 60 L. ed. 672.
Is Slaughter House Cases (1872), 16 Wall. 36; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.
S. 537.
19 State v. Richcreek (1906), 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085.

20 State v. Jacobson (1916), 80 Or. 648, 157 Pac. 1108; Fougera v. N. Y. (1917),

166 N. Y. S. 248, 178 App. Div. 824; Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training
School (1911), 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920.
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of law, but the petitioner must first seek a writ of habeas corpus in the state
Supreme Court.'
Due process of law is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States,
but it is not thereby defined. 2 Upon the Supreme Court of the United States
devolves the power to define "due process of law," but that body has thus
far refused to attempt any definition. 3 However, while the doctrine of due
process of law has not yet been limited by a definition, and hence can be
extended at the discretion of the Supreme Court, its meaning is discernible
from the various decisions in which it has been applied.
The guaranty of due process as a matter of procedure means that no part
of a person's personal liberty, including ownership, shall be taken away from
him except by the observance of certain formalities. 4 The essential requirements are that the fundamental principles of justice be preserved, that the
established and regular course of procedure be followed, and that the rights
of the party be determined and protected by a tribunal appointed by law. 5
The purpose of the guaranty of due process is to protect a person against
being deprived of his personal liberty by any person or authority unless
certain established procedural formalities are observed. 6 Thus due process
as a matter of procedure requires certain inherent elements of justice in the
determination of questions rather than the form by which the decision was
reached and does not have the effect of imposing upon the states any particular form or mode of procedure3
Due process of law as a matter of procedure is composed of four essential
elements, namely (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an impartial
tribunal, and (4) an orderly course of procedure, to all of which the person
whose rights are being determined is entitled.8 The first of these elements,
notice, in order to be sufficient, must constitute a notification to the person
of the time and place, including the tribunal before whom a claim is to be
made, apprise him of the nature of the cause against him, must come to a
person of reasonable intelligence and afford him sufficient opportunity to
prepare and make his answer. For an action in rem, notice by publication is
sufficient, but for an action not in rem, constructive notice is due process
only when personal service cannot be obtained even as to property within the
jurisdiction of the court. 9 The second element means that the person, before
he may be deprived of his liberty legally, must be given an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. He must be given the opportunity to appear and
defend his rights; that is, he must be given the opportunity to testify, to
' Mooney v. Holohan (1935), 79 L. ed. 347.

2 U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, sec. 1.

3 Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution (1926), 74 U.
of Pa. L. R. 331.
4 Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935).
5 12 C. J. 1188; Leeper v. Texas (1891), 139 U. S. 462 (Tex.) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson (1880), 103 U. S. 168 (D. C.); Turpin v. Lemon (1902), 187 U. S. 51 (W. Va.).
6 Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935);
R. G. Ludy, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1934), 356 Ill. 230, 190 N. E. 273; People v.
Belcastro (1934), 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301.
7 Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935);
Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309 (Ga.) ; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa (1896), 160
U. S. 389 (Iowa); Hooker v. Los Angeles (1903), 188 U. S. 314 (Cal.); Holmes v.
Conway (1916), 241 U. S. 624 (Kan.).
8 Reif v. Barrett (1933), 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889; Prescott v. State (1934), 37
P (2d.) 830 (Okla.) ; Louie Yung v. Coleman (1934), 5 Fed. Supp. 702 (Idaho) ; Frank
v. Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309 (Ga.)-; Ong Chang Wing v. United States (1910),
218 U. S. 272 (P. I.); Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet
unpublished (1935).
9 Prescott v. State (1934), 37 P (2d.) 830 (Okla.) ; Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935).
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produce witnesses in his behalf, and to produce relevant documents. Furthermore, the opportunity given must be reasonable and fair to the accused. 10
By an impartial tribunal is meant an unbiased and unprejudiced trier of fact
and administrator of law. There may be a judge and jury, or a judge alone, 1
or there may be some other body set up by law, such as a commission. 12 The
fourth element, an orderly course of procedure, is the phase of due process
which is primarily involved in the principal case.
The court in the principal case says that the requirement of due process
"in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the
action of the state, embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which
lie at the base of our civil and political institutions," and that "It is a
requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretence of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of
testimony known to be perjured." It goes on to say that "Such a contrivance
by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of
a like result by intimidation."' 13 These brief statements of the Supreme Court
suggest the essence of an orderly course of procedure; the observance of
those rules and principles which have been established by our system of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights, 14 in a
proceeding conducted according to the orderly processes of law.15 The
requirement of an orderly course of procedure does not require any particular form of procedure. Procedure sanctioned by settled usage will satisfy
the requirements, 16 but an orderly course of procedure is not limited to
procedure which has been sanctioned by settled usage. New forms of procedure are as much due process as old17forms, provided they give a person
a fair opportunity to present his case.
An orderly course of procedure requires the presence of witnesses when
the opportunity to defend oneself is involved,' 8 and it is due process to
compel attendance of witnesses. 19 An orderly course of procedure requires
a public trial. 20 There is not an orderly course of procedure when the same
person is inquisitor, interpreter, prosecutor, and judge, 2 ' or when access to
court is denied or hindered. 22 Mob domination of the court and proceedings
10 Molnar v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 669, 177 N. E. 452; Frank v. Mangum (1915),
237 U. S. 309 (Ga.) ; Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935).
11 Prescott v. State (1934), 37 P (2d.) 830 (Okla.).
12 Willis, Manuscript for Constitutional Law Textbook as yet unpublished (1935);
Kilbourn v. Thompson (1880), 103 U. S. 168 (D. C.).

13 Mooney v. Holohan (1935), 79 L. ed. 348, 349
14 Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan (1875),

(Cal.).

92 U. S.480, (La.) ; EndicottJohnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press (1924), 266 U. S. 285 (N. Y.) ; Turpin v. Lemon

(1902), 187 U. S. 51 (W. Va.) ; Reif v. Barrett (1933), 355 I1. 104, 188 N. E. 889.
'5 Ong. Chang Wing v. United States (1910), 218 U. S.272 (P. I.); Prescott v.

State (1934), 37 P. (2d.) 830 (Okla.) ; Reif v. Barrett (1933), 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889.
10 Murray v. Hoboken (1855), 18 How. 272 (N. Y.).
17 Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516 (Cal.) ; State of Missouri v. North

(1926), 271 U. S.40 (Mo.); Funk v. United States (1933), 290 U. S.371 (N. C.).
18 Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U. S.97 (Mass.).
19

Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926),

39 Harv. L. Rev. 720.
20

Gaines v. Washington (1928), 277 U. S.81 (Wash.); Frank v. Mangum (1915),

237 U.
2 S.309 (Ga.).

1Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privileges (1924), 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 444.
22 Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Minnesota (1890), 134 U. S.458 (Minn.); Ex Parte Young
(1908), 209 U. S.123 (Minn., Original Juris.).
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is not an orderly course of procedure.2 3 However, an orderly course of
procedure does not require a jury trial, 24 nor an appeal. 25 An orderly course
of procedure does not require a court to weigh the evidence, but it does
require it to examine the entire record, to ascertain the issues, to discover
whether there are facts not reported,
and to see whether or not the law has
26
been correctly applied to the facts.
The holding of the principal case, that the known use of perjured testimony by the prosecution is a violation of due process, is an extension of the
requirements of an orderly course of procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not mention such, nor have previous decisions so held. Yet it is now
law that the known use of perjured testimony is prohibited by the doctrine
of due process of law. It is undeniable that the object of the due process
clause, the protection of every citizen in his personal and property rights
against the arbitrary action of any person or authority 27 would be violated
by such action on the part of the prosecuting authorities of a state, but that
does not make it law. The answer to the question, Why is it law?, lies in the
United States Supreme Court. That body determines the law of the United
States; therein lies the real origin of the doctrine of due process of law.
The Supreme Court, with respect to the known use of perjured testimony
and the doctrine of due process, did not find the law; it made and is still
making it by its interpretation of the Constitution. 28
H. P. C.

Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of the Law - Garnishee Act.
Appellant was a judgment debtor and sought to enjoin appellees, a justice of
the peace and a constable, from issuing and levying an execution upon 10
per cent of the wages due appellant from his employer. Appellees would
have been acting pursuant to the terms of Chapter 61, Acts 1925, commonly
known as the Indiana Garnishee Law of 1925. Thus the issues raised the
validity of this act. Held, the Garnishee Law violates Section 23, Article 1
of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution, as well as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 1
Declaring unconstitutional a garnishment statute is rather novel in
view of the fact that there were garnishee laws even as far back as
colonial days,2 and that today such proceedings are generally authorized
throughout the states.3 Thus, to better understand the action of the court
here, it is well to bear in mind the constitutional and statutory provisions
relevant to this question as they were admirably set out in the principal case.
23 Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309 (Ga-) ; Waterman and Overton, Federal
Habeas Corpus Statutes and Moore v. Dempsey (1933), 1 U. Chi. L. Q. 307.
24 Jordan v. Massachusetts (1912), 225 Mass. 167, 114 N. E. 291; Crane v. Hahlo
(1922), 258 U. S. 147 (N. Y.).
25 State of Ohio v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. (1930), 281 U. S. 74 (Ohio).
26 International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1930), 280 U. S. 291

(C. C. A).

27 R. G. Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1934), 356 IIl. 230, 190 N. E. 273; People
v. Belcastro (1934), 356 Ili. 144, 190 N. E. 301; Wulzen v. San Francisco (1894), 101
Cal. 15, 20, 35 P. 353; McKinster v. Sager (1904), 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854; Hovey
v. Elliott (1897), 167 U. S. 409 (N. Y.).
28 Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution (1926), 74 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 339.
,Martin v. Loula (1935), 194 N. E. 178 (Ind.).
2 Treadway v. Andrews (1850), 20 Conn. 384, 392, referring to statute of 1784;
Ancient Charters and Laws, Mass. Bay, c. 267.
3 28 C. J. 17.

